City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (23-175)
Jail Time for Homelessness
is Not Cruel Nor Unusual Punishment
Washington, D.C., 6/28/24 SCOTUS announcements and briefs
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) today released their decision in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (23-175)* authorizing fines for first-time offenders and jail time for repeat offenders who violate a court order to not camp in restricted public spaces.
In the six to three decision, the majority wrote that fines and jail punishment by the City of Grants Pass for violating its law against camping in public “is neither cruel nor unusual” so it does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (23-175)*
SCOTUS’s 74 page Opinion regarding homelessness, redacted by Sage Editor, simply means as follows:
The law upheld in the Grant’s Pass SCOTUS case does not criminalize the status of being homeless; but rather, punishes a specific act of public camping in restricted areas.
The SCOTUS majority (6:3) wrote that the government’s punishment for camping in public spaces is not “cruel” because:
* it is not calculated to “super-add … terror, pain, or disgrace, and
* is not “unusual” because fines and jail time have NOT “long fallen out of use” [as punishment for violating the law] …
* Grants Pass, Oregon law does not criminalize the “status” of being homeless, but
* rather is directed at those who camp in areas restricted by law; and,
* thus, it is irrelevant whether the community provides free shelter or not.
* “The public-camping laws prohibit actions undertaken by any person, regardless of status.
* “It makes no difference whether the charged defendant is currently a person experiencing homelessness, a backpacker on vacation, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest on the lawn of a municipal building.
The decision distinguishes several prior SCOTUS cases as being irrelevant to the Grants Pass v. Johnson case.
SCOTUS did NOT overrule holdings of related similar cases ctied by the parties to the lawsuit; so SCOTUS honored the traditional doctrine of ‘stare decisis’ [stair-ray dee-ci-sis) which means great deference to prior precedent-setting cases known as cases of “first impression” or when a case presents new issues not decided before.
SCOTUS rarely overturns prior holdings; but, has done so in several Twentieth Century (1900s) cases [regarding racial segregation in public schools, etc.]; and, in the Twenty-First Century (2000s) [overturned Roe v. Wade on abortion, leaving abortion legal subject to approval and restriction by the various state legislatures].
Effect on Lexington, Ky.
Lexington Fayette County, Ky., provides generous benefits for its homeless population by donating money to some of the private non-profit NGOs for the following:
- shelters with shower facilities and other amenities for homeless people.
- free meals and clothing at various locations and including churches that do not get financial help from the city.
- a “work van” that transports people to job sites so they can earn money and avoid panhandling.
- other types of similar related help.
Lexington is somewhat of a haven for homeless people. In times of milder climate (non-winter) it is common to see homeless “encampments” at the corner of Elm Tree Lane and Third St., the
Ginny Ramsey, director of the local Catholic Action Center’s shelter on Industry Rd., Lexington, Ky., was contacted telephonically for comment; but, at press time, JK had not received a return call. JK updates stories based on new comment and verified information, so return here often or subscribe to RSS feed.
Her organization has a banner over the front entrance stating: “Ain’t no CRIME to be HOMELESS.” Unfortunately, many will construe SCOTUS’s Opinion to make homelessness into a crime.
The following directly quotes the SCOTUS Grant’s Pass v. Johnson holding verbatim (bold, italics, and underscores have been added by JK Sage Editor to help the average reader plow through the ‘legalese’):
Quoting SCOTUS:
“Held: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. …
“(a) The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment” a government may “impos[e] for the violation of criminal statutes.” …
“It was adopted to ensure that the new Nation would never resort to certain “formerly tolerated” punishments considered “cruel” because they were calculated to “super-add … terror, pain, or disgrace,’ and considered “unusual” because by the time of the Amendment’s adoption, they had “long fallen out of use.” …
“All that would seem to make the Eighth Amendment a poor foundation on which to rest the kind of decree the plaintiffs seek in this case and the Ninth Circuit has endorsed since Martin.
“The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the question what “method or kind of punishment” a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on the question whether a government may criminalize particular behavior in the first place. Powell, 392 U. S., at 531–532.
“The Court cannot say that the punishments Grants Pass imposes here qualify as cruel and unusual.
The city imposes only limited fines for first-time offenders, an order temporarily barring an individual from camping in a public park for repeat offenders, and a maximum sentence of 30 days in jail for those who later violate an order. See Ore. Rev. Stat. §§164.245, 161.615(3).
“Such punishments do not qualify as cruel because they are not designed to “superad[d]” “terror, pain, or disgrace.” Bucklew, 587 U. S., at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Nor are they unusual, because similarly limited fines and jail terms have been and remain among “the usual mode[s]” for punishing criminal offenses throughout the country. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 480.
“Indeed, cities and States across the country have long employed similar punishments for similar offenses. Pp. 15– 17.
“(b) Plaintiffs do not meaningfully dispute that, on its face, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not speak to questions like what a State may criminalize or how it may go about securing a conviction.
“Like the Ninth Circuit in Martin, plaintiffs point to Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, as a notable exception.
“In Robinson, the Court held that under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, California could not enforce a law providing that “‘[n]o person shall . . . be addicted to the use of narcotics.’” Id., at 660, n 1.
“While California could not make “the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense,” id., at 666, the Court emphasized that it did not mean to cast doubt on the States’ “broad power” to prohibit behavior even by those, like the defendant, who suffer from addiction. Id., at 664, 667–668.
“The problem, as the Court saw it, was that California’s law made the status of being an addict a crime. Id., at 666–667
“The Court read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause (in a way unprecedented in 1962) to impose a limit on what a State may criminalize.
“In dissent, Justice White lamented that the majority had embraced an “application of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ so novel that” it could not possibly be “ascribe[d] to the Framers of the Constitution.” 370 U. S., at 689.
“The Court has not applied Robinson in that way since. Whatever its persuasive force as an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, Robinson cannot sustain the Ninth Circuit’s Martin project.
“Robinson expressly recognized the “broad power” States enjoy over the substance of their criminal laws, stressing that they may criminalize knowing or intentional drug use even by those suffering from addiction. 370 U. S., at 664, 666.
“The Court held that California’s statute offended the Eighth Amendment only because it criminalized addiction as a status. Ibid. Grants Pass’s public-camping ordinances do not criminalize status.
“The public-camping laws prohibit actions undertaken by any person, regardless of status.
“It makes no difference whether the charged defendant is currently a person experiencing homelessness, a backpacker on vacation, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest on the lawn of a municipal building. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 159.
“Because the public-camping laws in this case do not criminalize status, Robinson is not implicated. Pp. 17–21. (c)
“Plaintiffs insist the Court should extend Robinson to prohibit the enforcement of laws that proscribe certain acts that are in some sense “involuntary,” because some homeless individuals cannot help but do what the law forbids. …”
JK Editor’s NOTES: The court’s case is City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (23-175)
Note that official Court Reporters (government authorized commercial publication of cases) will use the following citation identifying the permanent location of the publishd case as “603 U. S. ____ (2024).”
* Bold, italics, and underscores have been added by JK Sage Editor to help the average reader plow through the ‘legalese’ – JournalKentucky.com
TAGS:
#scotus, #supreme #court of the united states, #grant’s pass, #oregon, #homeless, #homelessness, #criminalize, #camping, #unauthorized area, #restricted, #campus protests, #dorm room, #case law, #cities can outlaw public homelessness, #cities cannot outlaw the status of being homeless, #public square, #places, #protests, #eighth amendment, #cruel punishment defined, #unusual punishment defined, #cruel and unusual punishment clarified, #stare decisis
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Endnotes:
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